Libya

[Hoosier]

Shit is getting real. Two Libyan Mirage fighters landed in Malta, asking for asylum after being asked to fire on protesters.
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/top/all/7439184.html

Their U.N. and other ambassadors are calling for Gadafi to step down

Unconfirmed: Group of soldiers who refused to fire on protesters were burned to death in their barracks. (Warning: this is disturbing video http://www.libyafeb17.com/?p=1402)

Unconfirmed: Reports of gunships and snipers opening up into crowds of protesters.

Bahrain is also getting antsy, home to the US Navy Fifth Fleet.

H.

[Zundfolge]

With Lybia I just can't imagine that even the Muslim Brotherhood would be worse than Gadafi. I seriously doubt a Jeffersonian Democratic Republic will sprout up there and whomever replaces Gadafi will probably be just as bad for the people (and us) but it'll be nice to see him fall ... maybe the Lockerbie Bomber will get his too.

[Elhuero]

when I first saw the headline that said protests had started in libya, my first thought was "those folks are dead meat"

if those people really want to be rid of their dictator, they need to take a page from reagan's playbook.

he knew how to deal with gaddafi

[Zundfolge]

if those people really want to be rid of their dictator, they need to take a page from reagan's playbook.

he knew how to deal with gaddafi

Yeah but unfortunately the Libyan people don't have access to F111s.

[Elhuero]

Yeah but unfortunately the Libyan people don't have access to F111s.


the principle is sound

[theGinsue]

As I said when it started in Egypt.... And so it begins.

[weirjf]

I'm just happy that there is an entire ocean between us and those mid-east lunatics

[sniper7]

only thing I am honestly worried about is the cost of my gas as a result.

[BPTactical]

As I said when it started in Egypt.... And so it begins.

The dominos begin to fall.............


"I'm just happy that there is an entire ocean between us and those mid-east lunatics"


Is there really an ocean between us? Everything that happens over there has a ripple effect just as Sniper 7 has already noted. Not to mention how many of these "Lunatics" are our society?

[2ndChildhood]

Stratfor is a paid intelligence service in Texas that provides free samples, here's what they just sent me this morning:


Revolution and the Muslim World

The Muslim world, from North Africa to Iran, has experienced a wave of instability in the last few weeks. No regimes have been overthrown yet, although as of this writing, Libya was teetering on the brink.

There have been moments in history where revolution spread in a region or around the world as if it were a wildfire. These moments do not come often. Those that come to mind include 1848, where a rising in France engulfed Europe. There was also 1968, where the demonstrations of what we might call the New Left swept the world: Mexico City, Paris, New York and hundreds of other towns saw anti-war revolutions staged by Marxists and other radicals. Prague saw the Soviets smash a New Leftist government. Even China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution could, by a stretch, be included. In 1989, a wave of unrest, triggered by East Germans wanting to get to the West, generated an uprising in Eastern Europe that overthrew Soviet rule.

Each had a basic theme. The 1848 uprisings attempted to establish liberal democracies in nations that had been submerged in the reaction to Napoleon. 1968 was about radical reform in capitalist society. 1989 was about the overthrow of communism. They were all more complex than that, varying from country to country. But in the end, the reasons behind them could reasonably be condensed into a sentence or two.

Some of these revolutions had great impact. 1989 changed the global balance of power (http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20081027_2008_and_return_nation_state). 1848 ended in failure at the time — France reverted to a monarchy within four years — but set the stage for later political changes. 1968 produced little that was lasting. The key is that in each country where they took place, there were significant differences in the details — but they shared core principles at a time when other countries were open to those principles, at least to some extent.

The Current Rising in Context

In looking at the current rising, the geographic area is clear: The Muslim countries of North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula have been the prime focus of these risings, and in particular North Africa (http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110114-north-africa-after-tunisia) where Egypt, Tunisia and now Libya have had profound crises. Of course, many other Muslim countries also had revolutionary events that have not, at least until now, escalated into events that threaten regimes or even ruling personalities. There have been hints of such events elsewhere. There were small demonstrations in China (http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110221-jasmine-protests-and-chinese-social-management), and of course Wisconsin is in turmoil over budget cuts. But these don’t really connect to what is happening in the Middle East. The first was small and the second is not taking inspiration from Cairo. So what we have is a rising in the Arab world that has not spread beyond there for the time being.

The key principle that appears to be driving the risings is a feeling that the regimes, or a group of individuals within the regimes, has deprived the public of political and, more important, economic rights — in short, that they enriched themselves beyond what good taste permitted. This has expressed itself in different ways. In Bahrain, for example, the rising was of the primarily Shiite population against a predominantly Sunni royal family (http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110214-shiite-unrest-bahrain). In Egypt, it was against the person of Hosni Mubarak. In Libya, it is against the regime and person of Moammar Gadhafi and his family (http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110218-unrest-succession-struggle-Libya), and is driven by tribal hostility.

Why has it come together now? One reason is that there was a tremendous amount of regime change in the region from the 1950s through the early 1970s, as the Muslim countries created regimes to replace foreign imperial powers and were buffeted by the Cold War. Since the early 1970s, the region has, with the exception of Iran in 1979, been fairly stable in the sense that the regimes — and even the personalities who rose up in the unstable phase — stabilized their countries and imposed regimes that could not easily be moved. Gadhafi, for example, overthrew the Libyan monarchy in 1969 and has governed continually for 42 years since then.

Any regime dominated by a small group of people over time will see that group use their position to enrich themselves. There are few who can resist for 40 years. It is important to recognize that Gadhafi, for example, was once a genuine, pro-Soviet revolutionary. But over time, revolutionary zeal declines and avarice emerges along with the arrogance of extended power. And in the areas of the region where there had not been regime changes since after World War I, this principle stays true as well, although interestingly, over time, the regimes seem to learn to spread the wealth a bit.

Thus, what emerged throughout the region were regimes and individuals who were classic kleptocrats. More than anything, if we want to define this wave of unrest, particularly in North Africa, it is a rising against regimes — and particularly individuals — who have been in place for extraordinarily long periods of time. And we can add to this that they are people who were planning to maintain family power and money by installing sons as their political heirs (http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101213-another-shift-egypts-presidential-succession-plan). The same process, with variations, is under way in the Arabian Peninsula. This is a rising against the revolutionaries of previous generations.

The revolutions have been coming for a long time. The rising in Tunisia (http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110114-tunisian-president-leaves-army-coup), particularly when it proved successful, caused it to spread. As in 1848, 1968 and 1989, similar social and cultural conditions generate similar events and are triggered by the example of one country and then spread more broadly. That has happened in 2011 and is continuing.

A Uniquely Sensitive Region

It is, however, happening in a region that is uniquely sensitive at the moment. The U.S.-jihadist war means that, as with previous revolutionary waves, there are broader potential geopolitical implications. 1989 meant the end of the Soviet empire, for example. In this case, the question of greatest importance is not why these revolutions are taking place, but who will take advantage of them. We do not see these revolutions as a vast conspiracy by radical Islamists to take control of the region. A conspiracy that vast is easily detected, and the security forces of the individual countries would have destroyed the conspiracies quickly. No one organized the previous waves, although there have been conspiracy theories about them as well. They arose from certain conditions, following the example of one incident. But particular groups certainly tried, with greater and lesser success, to take advantage of them.

In this case, whatever the cause of the risings, there is no question that radical Islamists will attempt to take advantage and control of them. Why wouldn’t they? It is a rational and logical course for them. Whether they will be able to do so is a more complex and important question, but that they would want to and are trying to do so is obvious. They are a broad, transnational and disparate group brought up in conspiratorial methods. This is their opportunity to create a broad international coalition. Thus, as with traditional communists and the New Left in the 1960s, they did not create the rising but they would be fools not to try to take advantage of it. I would add that there is little question but that the United States and other Western countries are trying to influence the direction of the uprisings. For both sides, this is a difficult game to play, but it is particularly difficult for the United States as outsiders to play this game compared to native Islamists who know their country.

But while there is no question that Islamists would like to take control of the revolution, that does not mean that they will, nor does it mean that these revolutions will be successful. Recall that 1848 and 1968 were failures and those who tried to take advantage of them had no vehicle to ride. Also recall that taking control of a revolution is no easy thing. But as we saw in Russia in 1917, it is not necessarily the more popular group that wins, but the best organized. And you frequently don’t find out who is best organized until afterwards.

Democratic revolutions have two phases. The first is the establishment of democracy. The second is the election of governments. The example of Hitler is useful as a caution on what kind of governments a young democracy can produce, since he came to power through democratic and constitutional means — and then abolished democracy to cheering crowds. So there are three crosscurrents here. The first is the reaction against corrupt regimes. The second is the election itself. And the third? The United States needs to remember, as it applauds the rise of democracy, that the elected government may not be what one expected (http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary_implications_hamas_victory).

In any event, the real issue is whether these revolutions will succeed in replacing existing regimes. Let’s consider the process of revolution for the moment, beginning by distinguishing a demonstration from an uprising. A demonstration is merely the massing of people making speeches. This can unsettle the regime and set the stage for more serious events, but by itself, it is not significant. Unless the demonstrations are large enough to paralyze a city, they are symbolic events. There have been many demonstrations in the Muslim world that have led nowhere; consider Iran.

It is interesting here to note that the young frequently dominate revolutions like 1848, 1969 and 1989 at first. This is normal. Adults with families and maturity rarely go out on the streets to face guns and tanks. It takes young people to have the courage or lack of judgment to risk their lives in what might be a hopeless cause. However, to succeed, it is vital that at some point other classes of society join them. In Iran, one of the key moments of the 1979 revolution was when the shopkeepers joined young people in the street. A revolution only of the young, as we saw in 1968 for example, rarely succeeds. A revolution requires a broader base than that, and it must go beyond demonstrations. The moment it goes beyond the demonstration is when it confronts troops and police. If the demonstrators disperse, there is no revolution. If they confront the troops and police, and if they carry on even after they are fired on, then you are in a revolutionary phase. Thus, pictures of peaceful demonstrators are not nearly as significant as the media will have you believe, but pictures of demonstrators continuing to hold their ground after being fired on is very significant.

A Revolution’s Key Event

This leads to the key event in the revolution. The revolutionaries cannot defeat armed men. But if those armed men, in whole or part, come over to the revolutionary side, victory is possible. And this is the key event. In Bahrain, the troops fired on demonstrators and killed some. The demonstrators dispersed and then were allowed to demonstrate — with memories of the gunfire fresh. This was a revolution contained. In Egypt, the military and police opposed each other and the military sided with the demonstrators (http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110211-mubarak-gone-egypts-system-stays), for complex reasons obviously. Personnel change, if not regime change, was inevitable. In Libya, the military has split wide open (http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110221-worrisome-signs-fractured-libyan-army).

When that happens, you have reached a branch in the road. If the split in the military is roughly equal and deep, this could lead to civil war. Indeed, one way for a revolution to succeed is to proceed to civil war, turning the demonstrators into an army, so to speak. That’s what Mao did in China. Far more common is for the military to split. If the split creates an overwhelming anti-regime force, this leads to the revolution’s success. Always, the point to look for is thus the police joining with the demonstrators. This happened widely in 1989 but hardly at all in 1968. It happened occasionally in 1848, but the balance was always on the side of the state. Hence, that revolution failed.

It is this act, the military and police coming over to the side of the demonstrators, that makes or breaks a revolution. Therefore, to return to the earlier theme, the most important question on the role of radical Islamists is not their presence in the crowd, but their penetration of the military and police. If there were a conspiracy, it would focus on joining the military, waiting for demonstrations and then striking.

Those who argue that these risings have nothing to do with radical Islam may be correct in the sense that the demonstrators in the streets may well be students enamored with democracy. But they miss the point that the students, by themselves, can’t win. They can only win if the regime wants them to, as in Egypt, or if other classes and at least some of the police or military — people armed with guns who know how to use them — join them. Therefore, looking at the students on TV tells you little. Watching the soldiers tells you much more.

The problem with revolutions is that the people who start them rarely finish them. The idealist democrats around Alexander Kerensky in Russia were not the ones who finished the revolution. The thuggish Bolsheviks did. In these Muslim countries, the focus on the young demonstrators misses the point just as it did in Tiananmen Square. It wasn’t the demonstrators that mattered, but the soldiers. If they carried out orders, there would be no revolution.

I don’t know the degree of Islamist penetration of the military in Libya, to pick one example of the unrest. I suspect that tribalism is far more important than theology. In Egypt, I suspect the regime has saved itself by buying time. Bahrain was more about Iranian influence on the Shiite population (http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/20110217-concerns-over-bahrain-saudi-arabia-and-iran) than Sunni jihadists at work. But just as the Iranians are trying to latch on to the process, so will the Sunni jihadists.

The Danger of Chaos

I suspect some regimes will fall, mostly reducing the country in question to chaos. The problem, as we are seeing in Tunisia, is that frequently there is no one on the revolutionaries’ side equipped to take power. The Bolsheviks had an organized party. In these revolutions, the parties are trying to organize themselves during the revolution, which is another way to say that the revolutionaries are in no position to govern. The danger is not radical Islam, but chaos, followed either by civil war, the military taking control simply to stabilize the situation or the emergence of a radical Islamic party to take control — simply because they are the only ones in the crowd with a plan and an organization. That’s how minorities take control of revolutions.

All of this is speculation. What we do know is that this is not the first wave of revolution in the world, and most waves fail, with their effects seen decades later in new regimes and political cultures. Only in the case of Eastern Europe do we see broad revolutionary success, but that was against an empire in collapse, so few lessons can be drawn from that for the Muslim world.

In the meantime, as you watch the region, remember not to watch the demonstrators. Watch the men with the guns. If they stand their ground for the state, the demonstrators have failed. If some come over, there is some chance of victory. And if victory comes, and democracy is declared, do not assume that what follows will in any way please the West — democracy and pro-Western political culture do not mean the same thing.

The situation remains fluid, and there are no broad certainties. It is a country-by-country matter now, with most regimes managing to stay in power to this point. There are three possibilities. One is that this is like 1848, a broad rising that will fail for lack of organization and coherence, but that will resonate for decades. The second is 1968, a revolution that overthrew no regime even temporarily and left some cultural remnants of minimal historical importance. The third is 1989, a revolution that overthrew the political order in an entire region, and created a new order in its place.

If I were to guess at this point, I would guess that we are facing 1848. The Muslim world will not experience massive regime change as in 1989, but neither will the effects be as ephemeral as 1968. Like 1848, this revolution will fail to transform the Muslim world or even just the Arab world. But it will plant seeds that will germinate in the coming decades. I think those seeds will be democratic, but not necessarily liberal. In other words, the democracies that eventually arise will produce regimes that will take their bearings from their own culture, which means Islam.

The West celebrates democracy. It should be careful what it hopes for: It might get it

Read more: Revolution and the Muslim World | STRATFOR (http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110221-revolution-and-muslim-world?utm_source=GWeekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=110222&utm_content=readmore&elq=797b5c7db8074775921bd0bdb2e48100#ixzz1EgxWCx9R )

Revolution and the Muslim World is republished with permission of STRATFOR.
(http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110221-revolution-and-muslim-world?utm_source=GWeekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=110222&utm_content=readmore&elq=797b5c7db8074775921bd0bdb2e48100)

[JohnTRourke]

say what you will about Qaddafi, but at least he knows how to hold onto power. The whole point of being a dictator and ruling with an iron hand, is in fact, ruling with an iron hand.

he won't fall. (not right now anyway)

[hip55]

Another SHTF action.

[rondog]

Gonna be an interesting year, that's for sure.

[JoeT]

it makes me wonder a little. . . when it happens here, will our soldiers refuse to shoot into the crowds too?

[Zundfolge]

I'm just happy that there is an entire ocean between us and those mid-east lunatics

Yeah ... well if things continue the way they're going (http://liveshots.blogs.foxnews.com/2011/02/21/hezbollah-working-with-cartels/), the only thing that's going to stand between us and those mid-east lunatics is a semi-dry riverbed along the Arizona/New Mexico/Texas border.

[Beprepared]

Good read. Thanks.

[Mtn.man]

Might see some SHTF realities soon near/on the border.

[rondog]

Reckon I'd better get back on my reloading press.......

[Mobat555]

it makes me wonder a little. . . when it happens here, will our soldiers refuse to shoot into the crowds too?

To my knowledge our government has never fired openly upon its citizens. It seems likely to me that it would be a very difficult choice for many if that order was ever issued. Foreign wars have allowed the mentality of "US vs Them", which to me would make violent actions easier to live with.

[AR15][Help]

[JohnTRourke]

To my knowledge our government has never fired openly upon its citizens.

[AR15][Help]

WRONG

Many many times.

[HBARleatherneck]

ludlow massacre in Colorado comes to mind. Not to mention all the eveil Indians that were massacred. I guess they didnt count as citizens, since they were not Christian. "them damn godless heathens must die"

[StagLefty]

To my knowledge our government has never fired openly upon its citizens.


Kent State for one !

[BigMat]

To my knowledge our government has never fired openly upon its citizens. It seems likely to me that it would be a very difficult choice for many if that order was ever issued. Foreign wars have allowed the mentality of "US vs Them", which to me would make violent actions easier to live with.

[AR15][Help]


Thankfully, not often, but it has happened, a few times, here are a few examples that I can think of-

WWI veterans, MacArthur and Paton were on the Gov't side of this one.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonus_Army (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonus_Army)

Kent state
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kent_State_shootings

Draft riots, Civil war
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_Draft_Riots


To be fair, I think these are exceptions to the rule. I don't think what is happening in Libya would happen here, unless it was a left leaning revolution, then maybe, based on the trend these set forth. Depends on how divided our country was

[Lex_Luthor]

A couple years ago, I asked my friend who is a Marine, if he would fire on American citizens if he was ordered to. I don't think I got an answer from him. I wonder what he would say....

[Mobat555]

Never hurts to get educated, so I guess we can look forward to being shot at by kids.

[Hoosier]

Gaddafi gave an hour+ long rambling speech yesterday, from the compound that the US bombed in '86, which hasn't been repaired and left as a "Monument".

This guy is bat shit crazy. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZJEA6qw471k There's some excerpt entries if you don't want to listen to lots of it.

Apparently the government no longer controls the eastern border with Egypt, several reporters drove through yesterday, many of the towns in the east of the country are held by civilians or army units that have defected.

IMHO Gaddafi won't be in power next week, he'll be lucky to have his head attached if he stays in country.

H.

[JoeT]

To my knowledge our government has never fired openly upon its citizens. It seems likely to me that it would be a very difficult choice for many if that order was ever issued. Foreign wars have allowed the mentality of "US vs Them", which to me would make violent actions easier to live with.

[AR15][Help]



I just read this story this morning. . . I don't know if it's factual

http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/02/23/use-live-ammunition-against-wisconsin-protesters-indiana-official-says/

[Mobat555]

I just read this story this morning. . . I don't know if it's factual

http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/02/23/use-live-ammunition-against-wisconsin-protesters-indiana-official-says/

I just came back to post the same thing, beat me to it.

[Zundfolge]

Well its okay now, we have nothing to worry about.

The UN Security Council has officially condemned Gadhafi's actions, so I'm sure he'll stop it and everything will be fine now (they even expressed "grave concern"!). Nothing more to see here ... move along.

Now if we could get them to make some sort of declarative statement on the spelling of Gadhafi we could all get some REAL peace.

[2ndChildhood]

From that article:

One official in Indiana suggested over the weekend that riot police should use deadly force on those protesting Wisconsin Republican Gov. Scott Walker's plan to strip unions of their rights.
A Saturday tweet from Mother Jones reported on the likelihood that police would soon be clearing the Wisconsin Capitol building of demonstrators.
"Use live ammunition," a Twitter user named JCCentCom replied (http://twitter.com/#%21/JCCentCom/status/39211723726651392).
When confronted, the Twitter user stood by his words, insisting that the protesters were "political enemies" and "thugs."
"[A]gainst thugs physically threatening legally-elected state legislators & governor? You're damn right I advocate deadly force," he wrote (http://twitter.com/#%21/JCCentCom/status/39213412865146880).
Mother Jones' Adam Weinstein later discovered that JCCentCom was a deputy attorney general (http://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?locale=en_US&id=44166956&srchtotal=5&authType=NAME_SEARCH&srchid=54ef9cd3-0c83-49a6-83fa-b8573dafe347-0&srchindex=3&pvs=ps&pohelp=&authToken=HO6P&goback=.fps_indiana_Jeff_Cox_*1_*1_*1_*1_*51_*1_Y_ *1_*1_*1_false_1_R_true_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2 _*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2_*2) at the Office of the Indiana Attorney General.
Wow just wow!
This is the response of a public official to those peacefully exercising their right to free speech.

Who was it who said "I disagree strongly with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it"
I always thought that saying was fundamental to our American freedoms.

Edit to add:
Seems the story is real, here's a link to an Indiana news station's story on the subject.
http://www.theindychannel.com/news/26966614/detail.html


I just read this story this morning. . . I don't know if it's factual

http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/02/23/use-live-ammunition-against-wisconsin-protesters-indiana-official-says/

[Hoosier]

Seems the story is real, here's a link to an Indiana news station's story on the subject.
http://www.theindychannel.com/news/26966614/detail.html

Being from Indiana and having a lot of friends still living there, my Facebook feed has been full of this, and yesterday about the state senators who fled to IL. There's also this, a Dem saying something equally stupid:

http://mikechamberslive.com/?p=11464

None of this is really news, people are entitled to their own opinions and can say whatever they want. They just aren't entitled to their own facts.

H.

[Elhuero]

A couple years ago, I asked my friend who is a Marine, if he would fire on American citizens if he was ordered to. I don't think I got an answer from him. I wonder what he would say....


of course he would.

[2ndChildhood]

Here's another update from Stratfor
Anyone can get on their mailing list for these free sample updates.

Jihadist Opportunities in Libya

As George Friedman noted in his geopolitical weekly “Revolution and the Muslim World (http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110221-revolution-and-muslim-world),” one aspect of the recent wave of revolutions we have been carefully monitoring is the involvement of militant Islamists, and their reaction to these events.

Militant Islamists, and specifically the subset of militant Islamists we refer to as jihadists (http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110120-jihadism-2011-persistent-grassroots-threat), have long sought to overthrow regimes in the Muslim world. With the sole exception of Afghanistan, they have failed, and even the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan was really more a matter of establishing a polity amid a power vacuum than the true overthrow of a coherent regime. The brief rule of the Supreme Islamic Courts Council in Somalia also occurred amid a similarly chaotic environment and a vacuum of authority.

However, even though jihadists have not been successful in overthrowing governments, they are still viewed as a threat by regimes in countries like Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. In response to this threat, these regimes have dealt quite harshly with the jihadists, and strong crackdowns combined with other programs have served to keep the jihadists largely in check.

As we watch the situation unfold in Libya, there are concerns that unlike Tunisia and Egypt, the uprising in Libya might result not only in a change of ruler but also in a change of regime and perhaps even a collapse of the state. In Egypt and Tunisia, strong military regimes were able to ensure stability after the departure of a long-reigning president. By contrast, in Libya, longtime leader Moammar Gadhafi has deliberately kept his military and security forces fractured and weak and thereby dependent on him. Consequently, there may not be an institution to step in and replace Gadhafi should he fall. This means energy-rich Libya could spiral into chaos, the ideal environment for jihadists to flourish (http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110221-jihadists-and-libya-uprising), as demonstrated by Somalia and Afghanistan.

Because of this, it seems an appropriate time to once again examine the dynamic of jihadism in Libya.

A Long History

Libyans have long participated in militant operations in places like Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and Iraq. After leaving Afghanistan in the early 1990s, a sizable group of Libyan jihadists returned home and launched a militant campaign aimed at toppling Gadhafi, whom they considered an infidel. The group began calling itself the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) in 1995, and carried out a low-level insurgency that included assassination attempts against Gadhafi and attacks against military and police patrols.

http://media.stratfor.com/files/mmf/6/7/67c67cf45cc652e167b0002d7715977a6f8f7ce3.jpg (http://web.stratfor.com/images/middleeast/map/LibyaMap800.jpg)
(click here to enlarge image) (http://web.stratfor.com/images/middleeast/map/LibyaMap800.jpg)


Gadhafi responded with an iron fist, essentially imposing martial law in the Islamist militant strongholds of Darnah and Benghazi and the towns of Ras al-Helal and al-Qubbah in the Jabal al-Akhdar region. After a series of military crackdowns, Gadhafi gained the upper hand in dealing with his Islamist militant opponents, and the insurgency tapered off by the end of the 1990s. Many LIFG members fled the country in the face of the government crackdown and a number of them ended up finding refuge with groups like al Qaeda in places such as Afghanistan.

While the continued participation of Libyan men in fighting on far-flung battlefields was not expressly encouraged by the Libyan government, it was tacitly permitted. The Gadhafi regime, like other countries in the region, saw exporting jihadists as a way to rid itself of potential problems. Every jihadist who died overseas was one less the government had to worry about. This policy did not take into account the concept of “tactical Darwinism,” (http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20091014_pakistan_south_waziristan_migration) which means that while the United States and its coalition partners will kill many fighters, those who survive are apt to be strong and cunning. The weak and incompetent have been weeded out, leaving a core of hardened, competent militants. These survivors have learned tactics for survival in the face of superior firepower and have learned to manufacture and effectively employ new types of highly effective improvised explosive devices (http://www.stratfor.com/imminent_spread_efps) (IEDs).

In a Nov. 3, 2007, audio message, al Qaeda No. 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri reported that the LIFG had formally joined the al Qaeda network. This statement came as no real surprise, given that members of the group have long been close to al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden. Moreover, the core al Qaeda group has long had a large number of Libyan cadre in its senior ranks, including men such as Abu Yahya al-Libi (http://www.stratfor.com/al_qaeda_next_generation), Anas al-Libi, Abu Faraj al-Libi (who reportedly is being held by U.S. forces at Guantanamo Bay) and Abu Laith al-Libi, who was killed in a January 2008 unmanned aerial vehicle strike in Pakistan.

The scope of Libyan participation in jihadist efforts in Iraq became readily apparent with the September 2007 seizure of a large batch of personnel files from an al Qaeda safe house in the Iraqi city of Sinjar (http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/libya_jihadist_threat). The Sinjar files were only a small cross-section of all the fighters traveling to Iraq to fight with the jihadists, but they did provide a very interesting snapshot. Of the 595 personnel files recovered, 112 of them were of Libyans. This number is smaller than the 244 Saudi citizens represented in the cache, but when one considers the overall size of the population of the two countries, the Libyan contingent represented a far larger percentage on a per capita basis. The Sinjar files suggested that a proportionally higher percentage of Libyans was engaged in the fighting in Iraq than their brethren from other countries in the region.

Another interesting difference was noted in the job-description section of the Sinjar files. Of those Libyan men who listed their intended occupation in Iraq, 85 percent of them listed it as suicide bomber and only 13 percent listed fighter. By way of comparison, only 50 percent of the Saudis listed their occupation as suicide bomber. This indicates that the Libyans tended to be more radical than their Saudi counterparts. Moroccans appeared to be the most radical, with more than 91 percent of them apparently desiring to become suicide bombers.

The Libyan government’s security apparatus carefully monitored those Libyans who passed through the crucible of fighting on the battlefield in places like Iraq and Afghanistan and then returned to Libya. Tripoli took a carrot-and-stick approach to the group (http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/libya_petrodollars_and_peace_jihadists) similar to that implemented by the Saudi regime. As a result, the LIFG and other jihadists were unable to pose a serious threat to the Gadhafi regime (http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/al_qaeda_2008_struggle_relevance), and have remained very quiet in recent years. In fact, they were for the most part demobilized and rehabilitated.

Gadhafi’s son, Seif al-Islam, oversaw the program to rehabilitate LIFG militants, which his personal charity managed. The regime’s continued concern over the LIFG was clearly demonstrated early on in the unrest when it announced that it would continue the scheduled release from custody of LIFG fighters.

The Sinjar reports also reflected that more than 60 percent of the Libyan fighters had listed their home city as Darnah and almost 24 percent had come from Benghazi. These two cities are in Libya’s east and happen to be places where some of the most intense anti-Gadhafi protests have occurred in recent days. Arms depots have been looted in both cities, and we have seen reports that at least some of those doing the looting appeared to have been organized Islamists.

A U.S. State Department cable drafted in Tripoli in June 2008 made available by WikiLeaks talked about this strain of radicalism in Libya’s east. The cable, titled “Die Hard in Derna,” was written several months after the release of the report on the Sinjar files. Derna is an alternative transliteration of Darnah, and “Die Hard” was a reference to the Bruce Willis character in the Die Hard movie series, who always proved hard for the villains to kill. The author of the cable, the U.S. Embassy’s political and economic officer, noted that many of the Libyan fighters who returned from fighting in transnational jihad battlefields liked to settle in places like Darnah due to the relative weakness of the security apparatus there. The author of the cable also noted his belief that the presence of these older fighters was having an influence on the younger men of the region who were becoming radicalized, and the result was that Darnah had become “a wellspring of foreign fighters in Iraq.” He also noted that some 60-70 percent of the young men in the region were unemployed or underemployed.

Finally, the author opined that many of these men were viewing the fight in Iraq as a way to attack the United States, which they saw as supporting the Libyan regime in recent years. This is a concept jihadists refer to as attacking the far enemy and seems to indicate an acceptance of the transnational version of jihadist ideology — as does the travel of men to Iraq to fight and the apparent willingness of Libyans to serve as suicide bombers.

Trouble on the Horizon?

This deep streak of radicalism in eastern Libya brings us back to the beginning. While it seems unlikely at this point that the jihadists could somehow gain control of Libya, if Gadhafi falls and there is a period of chaos in Libya, these militants may find themselves with far more operating space inside the country than they have experienced in decades. If the regime does not fall and there is civil war between the eastern and western parts of the country, they could likewise find a great deal of operational space amid the chaos. Even if Gadhafi, or an entity that replaces him, is able to restore order, due to the opportunity the jihadists have had to loot military arms depots, they have suddenly found themselves more heavily armed than they have ever been inside their home country. And these heavily armed jihadists could pose a substantial threat of the kind that Libya has avoided in recent years.

Given this window of opportunity, the LIFG could decide to become operational again, especially if the regime they have made their deal with unexpectedly disappears. However, even should the LIFG decide to remain out of the jihad business as an organization, there is a distinct possibility that it could splinter and that the more radical individuals could cluster together to create a new group or groups that would seek to take advantage of this suddenly more permissive operational environment. Of course, there are also jihadists in Libya unaffiliated with LIFG and not bound by the organization’s agreements with the regime.

The looting of the arms depots in Libya is also reminiscent of the looting witnessed in Iraq following the dissolution of the Iraqi army in the face of the U.S. invasion in 2003. That ordnance not only was used in thousands of armed assaults and indirect fire attacks with rockets and mortars, but many of the mortar and artillery rounds were used to fashion powerful IEDs. This concept of making and employing IEDs from military ordnance will not be foreign to the Libyans who have returned from Iraq (or Afghanistan, for that matter).

This bodes ill for foreign interests in Libya, where they have not had the same security concerns in recent years that they have had in Algeria or Yemen. If the Libyans truly buy into the concept of targeting the far enemy that supports the state, it would not be out of the realm of possibility for them to begin to attack multinational oil companies, foreign diplomatic facilities and even foreign companies and hotels.

While Seif al-Islam, who certainly has political motives to hype such a threat, has mentioned this possibility, so have the governments of Egypt and Italy. Should Libya become chaotic and the jihadists become able to establish an operational base amid the chaos, Egypt and Italy will have to be concerned about not only refugee problems but also the potential spillover of jihadists. Certainly, at the very least the weapons looted in Libya could easily be sold or given to jihadists in places like Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria, turning militancy in Libya into a larger regional problem. In a worst-case scenario, if Libya experiences a vacuum of power, it could become the next Iraq or Pakistan, a gathering place for jihadists from around the region and the world. The country did serve as such a base for a wide array of Marxist and rejectionist terrorists and militants in the 1970s and 1980s.

It will be very important to keep a focus on Libya in the coming days and weeks — not just to see what happens to the regime but also to look for indicators of the jihadists testing their wings.


Read more: Jihadist Opportunities in Libya | STRATFOR (http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110223-jihadist-opportunities-libya?utm_source=SWeekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=110224&utm_content=readmore&elq=743599d15f47432e8c9813ea4595776d#ixzz1EsdoSTyq )

Jihadist Opportunities in Libya is republished with permission of STRATFOR.

[mitch]

Thnks for the link, 2nd. Interesting reading.

I know I'll sleep better knowing the UN has sent a strongly worded letter. Thank god for the pen being mightier than a well placed sniper team. Wait....does that mean there will be waiting periods before I can shop at 'Papyrus and Things' in the mall?


OT: The author (George Friedman) looks like the offspring of Dubya and Mr Magoo.

12eNAovkDTM

[Elhuero]

Wow just wow!
This is the response of a public official to those peacefully exercising their right to free speech.

Who was it who said "I disagree strongly with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it"
I always thought that saying was fundamental to our American freedoms.




they're not exercising their free speech, they are voicing their support for the democrat's refusal of our democracy, and their attempt to supplant wisconsin's constitution with their own autocratic rule.

they were going to lose the vote, so they scuttle the democratic process then flood the capitol with union backed professional protesters to demand that the governor "compromise" with (i.e. conform to) their opinion.

to me this seems like the kind of tyranny our founding fathers were worried about.

they shit on the whole system of government, and by default shit on the principles behind it (life, liberty) then pat themselves on the back for standing up to "the man" for "their rights"

meanwhile the state is broke, and when it collapses and the teacher's paychecks stop they'll march again with signs saying "blood from turnips!"

[2ndChildhood]

So are you saying it's fine for a deputy district attorney to suggest using live ammunition to clear out the protestors?

My point is that regardless whether I agree or disagree with the protestors, their right to speech is one of the most fundamental in our country.
If we condone use of force (or the threat) to restrict that speech, who is going to come to our aid when force is unlawfully turned against us?

Note - I am not supporting the acts of the democrats at all.
I am simply outraged that talk of live ammunition is considered a reasonable response to someone's speech that one disagrees with.


they're not exercising their free speech, they are voicing their support for the democrat's refusal of our democracy, and their attempt to supplant wisconsin's constitution with their own autocratic rule.

they were going to lose the vote, so they scuttle the democratic process then flood the capitol with union backed professional protesters to demand that the governor "compromise" with (i.e. conform to) their opinion.

to me this seems like the kind of tyranny our founding fathers were worried about.

they shit on the whole system of government, and by default shit on the principles behind it (life, liberty) then pat themselves on the back for standing up to "the man" for "their rights"

meanwhile the state is broke, and when it collapses and the teacher's paychecks stop they'll march again with signs saying "blood from turnips!"

[Byte Stryke]

So are you saying it's fine for a deputy district attorney to suggest using live ammunition to clear out the protestors?

My point is that regardless whether I agree or disagree with the protestors, their right to speech is one of the most fundamental in our country.
If we condone use of force (or the threat) to restrict that speech, who is going to come to our aid when force is unlawfully turned against us?

Note - I am not supporting the acts of the democrats at all.
I am simply outraged that talk of live ammunition is considered a reasonable response to someone's speech that one disagrees with.


I do not believe the primary point of contention in this is the message as much as it is the way in which it is being delivered.
One's rights to free speech end at the border of fair and legal process. when your right to assemble and express yourself interferes with someone elses rights, you have exceeded your rights.

This is also the primary argument against westboro baptists.
They too have the right to express themselves, however they do not have the right to interrupt a funeral to do it.


just my 2 cents

[Elhuero]

So are you saying it's fine for a deputy district attorney to suggest using live ammunition to clear out the protestors?





hell yes. political correctness is a cancer.





My point is that regardless whether I agree or disagree with the protestors, their right to speech is one of the most fundamental in our country.
If we condone use of force (or the threat) to restrict that speech, who is going to come to our aid when force is unlawfully turned against us?

.

it was a tongue in cheek suggestion that nobody took seriously.

well, almost nobody..... nobody but the guy's bosses who caved to the PC pressure and fired him for using his right to free speech to say something in contrary to the current popular opinion.

some speech is freer than others I guess.

[mitch]

Bump for official-ness: the UN has voted for "Sanctions".

Nothing says "we mean business" like sanctions on a 3rd world African country.