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Except in the digital realm - once it is created, its out there forever. All it takes is for a copy to get loose and now we all get to have fun. There is absolutely zero difference between a one-time/just-this-once/just for this device and a permanent backdoor for everyone. Once you get into the security of how the actual protections work you will see why that is the case.Quote:
Originally Posted by Skip
The government just wants to pile in your back door.
Snowden: FBI's claim that only Apple can unlock the iPhone is 'bullshit'
Quote:
WHISTLEBLOWER Edward Snowden has described the FBI's claim that only Apple can unlock an iPhone to investigate the communications of the San Bernardino shooters as "bullshit".
Snowden joins a growing number of commentators questioning the FBI's true intentions behind thedemands on Apple, which have been rebuffed by CEO Tim Cook who argues that the agency is in effect demanding that his firm makes obsolete security technology it has spent considerable time and effort creating.
Snowden was speaking by video feed at pro-democracy organisation Common Cause's Blueprint for a Great Democracy conference in Washington DC yesterday. He stated that "we have to use the technical community to enforce our rights" instead of allowing the government to force co-operation that may be unethical or undemocratic.
"We do have some evidence today of methods that do work. The Apple versus the FBI case is a good example of this," said Snowden, adding that "the FBI would not be as pissed off as they are" if Apple wasn't setting an important precedent by flatly refusing to co-operate.
Snowden, like others, disputes assertions that the FBI's demands on Apple are about simply getting to the bottom of one case.
"The FBI has said in court that Apple has the ‘exclusive technical means' - these are their words - the ‘exclusive technical means' [to access the device]," said Snowden. "Respectfully, that's bullshit."
Snowden explained that there have been similar attacks since the 1990s that the FBI has investigated without calling for any specific assistance from technology vendors.
David Davis, MP for Haltemprice and Howden, and a former shadow home secretary, agreed with Snowden in a recent conversation with The INQUIRER, stating that the FBI's argument for forcing Apple to develop a security bypassing tool seems unfounded.
"The truth is that terrorist encryption is often in the form of agreed phrases. The Omagh bombing in Northern Ireland, when the signal was given back by the bombers that the thing was placed, [the perpetrator] said: ‘The brick is in the wall.' He didn't say: ‘I've placed the bomb,'" Davis said.
"It's rather obviously a code phrase, but you might use a more mundane code phrase. So even if you did away with encryption, all you'd do is make them move on to something more sophisticated.
"So, generally speaking, I'm on Apple's side in this argument. It sounds hard, but the truth is what are they going to learn from these two [perpetrators]? They will already know who they talk to. They get that through metadata. They wouldn't need the phone for that."
I actually went and listened to Snowden's comments on it, and I have to agree.
The idea that so many apple-fan-boi's have, that apples encryption is unbreakable, is naive, bordering on stupidity. The FBI's cyber division can easily get into this phone, but they are pushing for the "legal" means to do it for EVERY phone they come across.
In reality, I know quite a few engineers that could get into the phone without apple's help, and without disabling the "x many tries, then wipe" "secucrity".
Something seems left out of the equation here (which I alluded to before): why do so many people think that you need physical access to a digital device to find out what's on it? Didn't the original Snowden revelations show that every big communications company including Comcast, Verizon, AT&T, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Google are already in cahoots with the NSA? Based on that, I think It's fairly safe to assume that any digital transmission is monitored/recorded in some way but would most of the relevant data for this case even be encrypted? What if there isn't anything relevant to the crime even encrypted on the phone?
Bingo. You have to have an idea that we have the ability to break military grade encrypted communications....so an iPhone is easy pickings. They just need the cover that this legal action would provide.Quote:
Originally Posted by Grant H.
So is this like a more boring version of Sicario?
Phone conversations are stored for a set period of time (I don't actually know how long that is), unless they are given higher priority. Higher priority can be given for several things, including a long list of key words/phrases that the automated system watches for. Other reasons include NSA/CIA/Warranted LEO interest in certain people. But, unless you give them reason to want to go back through your recorded calls, they roll off the storage rather quickly. The record of the call (from, to, duration, cell tower used, often GPS, etc) is all stored by the phone company for a LOT longer. Texts take up very little space, so I assume they are stored for quite some time, but I have no idea how long. They are sent as plain text, not encrypted, so those are easy to scan realtime for concerns.Quote:
Originally Posted by HoneyBadger
The problem is the actual space used for all of the NSA's intercepts, so they have to prioritize. When Snowden released his information, several years ago now, there were sites where they were collecting so much information that they could only store it for 24 hours. He was talking about 20+ Terabytes of data per day. Hard drives have gotten bigger, so they can probably hold it for longer, but the number of phones has also gone up. So who actually knows how long they can keep the un-prioritized data at this point.
Now, if all that data was over written before the phone number of the suspects was known, then the only thing left as a record is the information the phone company keeps, which can be helpful, but is pretty limited. They are going to want to go through the phone in great detail to try and uncover information about the attackers and accomplices that the phone records wouldn't/couldn't show.