Pueblo Police to Encrypt Radios

[TheGrey]

The state went out and paid for a bunch of repeaters and a state radio system in which they have what they call MAC (mutual aid channels) channels that are programmed into all cooperating agencies radios, so they can speak to each other as long as they are on the same type systems. The problem as described above is, they are unencrypted and anyone can hear. Back in Columbine time, we had people on the 155 MHz, 400 MHz and 800 MHz systems and they could not speak to each other. Now, most are on the 800MHz and above systems.

Ah! Thank you for that explanation. That makes sense.

[asmo]

Taxpayers paid for all the military radios, too. But that doesn't mean the .mil is going to run in the clear when stateside.

"..the traditional American principle of separating civilian and military authority." There is a difference between the .mil and the civilian police. While we, as a nation, have tended to confuse the two over the last 20 years - it doesn't mean the principal shouldn't be upheld. See the Posse Comitatus Act and the Insurrection Act of 1807.

There have been tens of thousands of cases where people who listen to scanners have caught bad actors doing bad things. Those bad actors tend to be civil officials lying, stealing, and hurting others. When departments encrypt the public looses... "they who can give up essential Liberty to obtain a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety".

If OPSEC and COMSEC is a real concern for them (which it should be), then they should probably run a split model and have a publicly available channel for basic, non-impacting stuff. Don't a lot of Dept's already do that anyway for SWAT situations?

I won't get into the technical difficulties of this as it isn't really germane to the discussion - but it comes down to costs. Radios that can do per TGID encryption cost more than radios that do per frequency band encryption. There is also a operational costs of managing encryption keys on a per TGID/situation basis. It gets out of control rather quickly.

[CS1983]

"..the traditional American principle of separating civilian and military authority." There is a difference between the .mil and the civilian police. While we, as a nation, have tended to confuse the two over the last 20 years - it doesn't mean the principal shouldn't be upheld. See the Posse Comitatus Act and the Insurrection Act of 1807.

There have been tens of thousands of cases where people who listen to scanners have caught bad actors doing bad things. Those bad actors tend to be civil officials lying, stealing, and hurting others. When departments encrypt the public looses... "they who can give up essential Liberty to obtain a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety".



I won't get into the technical difficulties of this as it isn't really germane to the discussion - but it comes down to costs. Radios that can do per TGID encryption cost more than radios that do per frequency band encryption. There is also a operational costs of managing encryption keys on a per TGID/situation basis. It gets out of control rather quickly.

While I don't necessarily disagree with you, I definitely would not want my transmissions in the clear during an operation if those transmissions could result in an unnecessary escalation.

[Ronin13]

I am against the whole encryption thing. I get the 'safety' argument but it doesn't trump the 'Taxpayers paid for this, so they have a right to listen.' argument. The whole point of having unencrypted comms for public servants is so that people could monitor what was going on. Encrypting the comms is a slap in the face to every single tax payer. This is bad policy.

Those that know me know that, among other things, I design, build, and engineer *real* encrypted comm architectures for a living. So this is something that I know a little more than something about.

You also don't work in LE, so this is something you know a little less about. There is still a lot that goes on, real time, that are beneficial to keep out of the hands of the public, such as ongoing searches, attempts to locate, and felony apprehensions. I don't see encryption of LE radio traffic as a slap in the face, I see it as a means of keeping us safe. If I'm out on a search for a violent suspect, and we set up a perimeter, and air that information over the radio (without encryption) and the bad guy has a scanner app that can hear our comms, he knows exactly where we are and can map that out to avoid detection or even ambush those units. You want transparency? Do what they do with video and other data- fill out a FOIA request after-the-fact and the agency should be more than happy to oblige. But going on in real time, no, you shouldn't have a *right* to that for officer safety reasons.

[asmo]

You also don't work in LE, so this is something you know a little less about.

You're right. I don't work as in LE, so my opinion is obviously worth less than someone who does. Regardless of whether I have any knowledge or experience, of any sort, that could shed information on the debate - even if that experience and knowledge comes from working with hundreds of departments around the world, authoring numerous papers on the subject, or testifying in front of FCC about such matters.

There is still a lot that goes on, real time, that are beneficial to keep out of the hands of the public, such as ongoing searches, attempts to locate, and felony apprehensions. I don't see encryption of LE radio traffic as a slap in the face, I see it as a means of keeping us safe. If I'm out on a search for a violent suspect, and we set up a perimeter, and air that information over the radio (without encryption) and the bad guy has a scanner app that can hear our comms, he knows exactly where we are and can map that out to avoid detection or even ambush those units. You want transparency? Do what they do with video and other data- fill out a FOIA request after-the-fact and the agency should be more than happy to oblige. But going on in real time, no, you shouldn't have a *right* to that for officer safety reasons.

By your same argument, citizens should not have access to anything that could pose a threat to officer safety. Right?

Officer safety is a critical topic, but so are the rights of the People to have transparency in their government. There is a balance to be struck (in this argument), but that balance, currently, comes at a rather stiff financial and operational penalty. When someone comes out and just screams "Officer Safety" I know they are doing from a place of concern - but it cannot be used as a catch-all to render moot the peoples rights. Those same rights that officers are supposed to be working so hard to protect.

[zteknik]

I thought most departments out here had encryption already? Yea when I was at Ground Zero the comms was a nightmare to say the least. We had to have a multitude of radios to keep up with what was going on.

[Eric P]

"..the traditional American principle of separating civilian and military authority." There is a difference between the .mil and the civilian police. While we, as a nation, have tended to confuse the two over the last 20 years - it doesn't mean the principal shouldn't be upheld. See the Posse Comitatus Act and the Insurrection Act of 1807.

There have been tens of thousands of cases where people who listen to scanners have caught bad actors doing bad things. Those bad actors tend to be civil officials lying, stealing, and hurting others. When departments encrypt the public looses... "they who can give up essential Liberty to obtain a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety".

Would it matter if the radio broadcast was rebroadcast unedited to the public, but delayed, say 24 to 48 hours?

This satisfies both lawful sides. Keeps officers safe realtime, and the public gets full access to police comms.

[.455_Hunter]

If I hear a bunch of sirens rolling into my neighborhood, I want to be able to know what is occuring and whether I need to take action to safeguard my family and property. Reverse 911 and other "alert" systems always operating behind the power curve in terms of timely information. This applies to LE actions and other emergencies, like forest fires.

[asmo]

I don't think some people realize the scale of DTRS (Colorado's trunked comm system). A quick look shows DTRS currently has ~3,400 unique talk groups and ~300 towers. It also averages abound 9M 'calls' a month. That is one of the largest in the country.

Encryption requires installation of additional software and/or hardware in radios and dispatch consoles - every single radio/console involved in the encrypted comms requires an upgrade. Additionally the encryption keys need to be managed and changed frequently.

Also, the various 'scanner apps' typically delay their re-transmissions over the Internet by 5-10 minutes. Further, many of them do not include SWAT and 'sensitive' channels.

[Irving]

Obviously public safety should outweigh every other single deciding factor.